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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Intelligence Community Seminar on Unauthorized Disclosures

3 August 1983, 1430 Hours, 1-A-07

FROM:

Lavon B. Strong
Director, Public Affairs Office

EXTENSION

NO.

PAO 83-0004/7

25X1

DATE

1 August 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

D/O-Security

8/01 K

Mr. Casey:

2.

DCI

- OR 13

Attached are materials for your "leak" session in Room 1-A-07 at 1430 on Wednesday, 3 August.

3.

EXDIR (CPY FORWARDED)

Some talking points are included for your consideration, along with an agenda, list of attendees, and background memoranda.

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DDCI (CPY FORWARDED)

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Lavon B. Strong

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AGENDA

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SEMINAR ON
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES

CIA Headquarters, Room 1-A-07
3 August 1983

2:15 - 2:30	Introduction	Director of Security
2:30 - 3:00	<u>The Unauthorized Disclosures Problem</u>	Director of Central Intelligence
3:00 - 3:15	Premiere of DCI Videotape Presentation	
3:15 - 3:30	Follow-up to Videotape	Chairman, DCI Security Committee
3:30 - 3:45	<u>The Press vs. Secrecy The Challenge</u>	Director of Security

PROPOSED DCI REMARKS FOR COMMUNITY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

Thank you for coming. The problem of leaks has gotten out of hand. I think it's time we consulted you, the experts on the media, to see what can be done.

The Problem:

This country's most sensitive information is finding its way into the press with ever increasing rapidity. It is unacceptable when the contents of sensitive cables are disclosed to the public. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

National security is

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being damaged. Intelligence assets are being lost. We are unable to conduct business in an effective way for fear that what we say will appear in print--and it all too often does. I have had to move people around. We have lost agents. Sources have dried up. Other services [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

have demurred or

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outright rejected our requests for information or joint activities because of the danger of public exposure.

SECRET

In short, leaks have reached crisis proportions, and we have to come up with better ways to deal with them. There are severe limits on what we can do and what we have done has not been very effective. Even when we know the identity of the leaker, we lack the kind of legal proof needed for prosecution.

The Media:

The media's responsibility to print the news is often in conflict with our need to protect classified information. All too often the media use Government officials, and in particular our public affairs officers, to glean bits and pieces that add up to disclosure. Too often media queries are mere speculations that become fact only after discussion with various officials. We understand your responsibility to be forthcoming when you can, and your need to leave a positive image with the press, but there is also an obligation to protect information.

What To Do

It is vital that public affairs officers, who are on the front line in dealing with the media, work together to ensure legitimate public affairs channels do not contribute to the problem. There are a few obvious things we all need to do:

--Stress to all our contacts that classified information is Government property and is subject to all the law and regulations that restrict its use.

--Require all employees to report media contacts and impose sanctions for not reporting.

--Prescribe clear and unmistakable authorization channels for press contacts and follow-up discussions.

--Require any "official" or "authorized" discussion be in full accord with Judge Clark's 8 November 1982 letter and NSDD 84 (copies attached).

--Help the people you support to understand what is sensitive about intelligence reporting and why it is so vulnerable.

--Draw a distinction between "whistle-blowers" who expose corruption and "leakers" who abuse their access to secrets.

--Ensure public affairs and/or security officers are present for all media interviews on intelligence-related matters.

--Maintain a retrievable record of participants and subjects covered in all interviews, background briefings, etc.

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--Ensure that no classified documents are given or displayed.

--Beware of unauthorized, direct follow-up contacts by the media after approved contacts with subject matter experts.

--Publicize the policy on media contacts, stressing the risk of damage through unguarded comments.

Specific Proposal

As I proposed in the letter I sent you, I want to set up specific procedures for quick reaction when we learn ahead of time that classified information is about to be disclosed. I have found many journalists to be responsible, patriotic people who will cooperate to protect classified information once they understand the damage that will result. Often as individuals we become aware that an article will appear with classified information, but there is no mechanism for assessing the importance of the information or the damage it will do. Nor do we have an established channel for getting back to the journalist or his superiors to acquaint them with the damage this item will have.

SECRET

My proposal would set up procedures to overcome these problems, but it would require close cooperation among all of you here and would require quick reaction on all our parts, including myself and other senior officials. I would like each public affairs office to act quickly to check out any instance of potential disclosure and, when it is determined that the disclosure includes classified information, to notify my Public Affairs Office immediately. In cooperation with the appropriate security office, my office will determine the potential damage and relay that information to me. Then I, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate agency, will assess the potential damage and consider how to respond to limit the damage.

These are a few of my ideas. Now I would like to hear your ideas and any comments and questions you have on my proposals.

Attachments:

8 November 1982 ltr fr Judge Clark (at left)

NSDD 84 (at left)


1 August 1983 - TENTATIVE LIST

DCI Leak's Meeting
Wednesday, 3 August 1983
Room 1 A 07
2:15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Robert B. Sims - Director of Public Affairs

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

 - Director, National Security Agency
- Chief, Information Affairs Division
- General Counsel

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Honorable Henry E. Catto, Jr. - Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Brig. Gen. Walter (Mike) Cousland - Deputy Assistant of Defense for Public Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. John Hughes - Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Mr. Alan Romberg - Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Ms. Mary Ann Yoden - Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Roger S. Young - Assistant Director for Congressional and Public Affairs
Mr. Antonius Genakos - Inspector Deputy Assistant Director for Congressional and Public Affairs
- Mr. David L. Divan - Section Chief, Public Affairs
- Mr. Edward H. Gooderham - Unit Chief, Media Services Unit

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Commodore Jack A. Garrow - Chief of Information
Cdr. George Vercessi - Assistant Chief of Information for Plans and Program

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Col. David O. Schillerstrom - Deputy Director, Air Force Public Affairs

U.S. ARMS CONTROL and DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Joseph D. Lehman - Public Affairs Adviser

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Chief of Legislative and Public Affairs

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Maj. Gen. Llyle J. Barker, Jr. - Chief of Public Affairs
Col. Patrick D. Chisolm, Jr. - Office of Chief, Public Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - Not heard from

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY - Not heard from

1 August 1983

List for DCI Brief and Videotape 3 August 1983, 1415 Hours

SECOM Principals

USAF - Roger D. Smith

ARMY - Col. Donald A. Press

CIA

DIA

OSD - Anthony G. Mitchell

FBI - Lloyd E. Dean

Justice - Jerry Rubino

Navy - Robert Allen

NSA

OSAF - James Callahan

State - Marvin L. Garrett

Treasury - Dennis E. Southern

SECOM STAFF

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Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee

CIA [redacted] 25X1

USAF - Lt. Karen Diggs

Army - William H. Poage

CIA [redacted] 25X1
DIA [redacted]

DIS - Louis J. Travalino

DOE - Barry L. Rich

FBI - Charles A. Stapleton

Justice - Thomas Marum

Navy - Barbara Szymanski

NSA [redacted] 25X1

OSAF - Maj. Arthur Davis

OSD - Maj. Richard C. Company

Treasury - Marion Dana

Security Awareness Subcommittee

NSA 25X1

USAF - Represented by UDIS Subcommittee Member

Army - Carl Bjorkman

CIA 25X1

DIA

DOE - Stephen Slaughter

FBI - Joseph Waggoner

Justice - Marjorie L. Forrester

Navy - Patricia Kiley

NSA 25X1

State - Judson J. Barnes

Treasury - Edward J. Dansereau